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1. Introduction
A celebrated argument for the claim that natural languages are compositional is
the learnability argument. Brieﬂy: for it to be possible to learn an entire natural
language, which has inﬁnitely many sentences, the language must have a com-
positional semantics. This argument has two main problems: One of them con-
cernsthedifferencebetweencompositionalityandcomputability: iftheargument
is good at all, it only shows that the language must have a computable semantics,
which allows speakers to compute the meanings of new sentences. But a seman-
ticsmaybecomputablewithoutbeingcompositional(andviceversa). Whywould
we want the semantics to be compositional over and above being computable?
The learnability argument doesn’t tell us.
The idea that is developed here is that we get further requirements on seman-
tics by looking at linguistic communication, and in particular at the feature that
we manage to convey new contents by means of new sentences in real time, i.e.
that a hearer manages to compute the meaning on-line of an uttered sentence at
speed that matches the speed of speech. It would seem that this can be explained
only if the computation steps needed for interpretation are comparatively few and
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1easy. We can even claim that between two semantic theories, if one allows for less
complex computation, then it helps explaining on-line interpretation better than
its rival. This is elaborated upon in section 3.
In order to justify a particular kind of semantics in this way, we would want
to show that a semantics of kind in some respect minimizes computational com-
plexity. The relevance of computational complexity for cognition is discussed in
section 4. Sections 5-6 are devoted to selecting an appropriate complexity mea-
sure. Section 7 discusses the nature of minimal complexity under this measure.
Section 8, ﬁnally, sketches an argument that the class of minimal semantics is de-
rived from standard compositional semantics by means of one restriction and one
generalization. The net result is that complexity considerations do give us a new
reason for believing that natural language semantics is compositional (in the re-
stricted way), or else has generalized (restricted) compositionality.
Before proceeding with the later sections, we will need to relate the concepts
of compositionality, computability and recursiveness. This is the task of the next
section.
2. Preliminaries
I shall call a function ¹ that maps syntactic items on meanings (irrespective of
what entities serve as meanings) a semantic function. I shall call a function ½i that
for some n maps meanings m1,...,mn on a meaning m a (meaning) composition
function. A generalized composition function ½ is then a function such that, given
a language L, for any syntactic operator ® in L, ½(®) is a composition function.
Then, a semantic function ¹ for a language L is compositional just in case there is
a generalized composition function ½ such that for each operator ¾ in L and any
relevant syntactic items t1,...,tn (with ¹ deﬁned for ¾(t1,...,tn)) it holds that
(PC) ¹(¾(t1,...,tn))Æ½(¾)(¹(t1),...,¹(tn)).
2Intuitively,(PC)saysthatthemeaningofthecomplexisafunction(½)ofthemean-
ings of the parts and the mode of composition (¾).1
The syntactic items may be expressions, i.e. surface strings. But in general
strings are syntactically ambiguous in that they can be generated in more than
one way from atomic expressions and operations. The semantic function must
take disambiguated items as arguments (since the meaning may depend on the
derivation, not just on the resulting string). Hence, when expressions are am-
biguous, expressions cannot (always) be the arguments. Instead, it is common
to take the arguments to be terms, whose surface syntax reﬂect the derivation of
the string. To give a simple example: where ¾ is an operation that maps a noun
phrase and a verb phrase on a sentence by means of concatenation, we have the
string ‘John runs’ (where ‘ ’ marks the word space that is part of the string), with
the corresponding term ‘¾(John,runs)’.
Here I shall be concerned with the syntactic terms and regard the syntactic
domain T as a domain of terms. The domain E of expressions is derived from T
by an evaluation function V . V corresponds, in classical generative grammar, to a
mapping from deep structures to surface structures.2
Now, it is clear that a compositional semantics need not be recursive. For the
semantic function ¹ is recursive just in case the generalized composition function
½ is recursive, but it is not required in the deﬁnition (PC) (or in any common def-
inition of compositionality) that ½ be recursive. It must be a function of the right
type, i.e. with the right arguments and values, that is all. Hence, compositionality
does not entail recursiveness.
Neither does recursiveness entail compositionality. In arithmetic, a recursive
function is either a projection function that selects an argument from a sequence
of arguments, the constant zero function, the successor operation s, or a func-
tion deﬁned from these by means of function composition, primitive recursion, or
minimization. The counterpart to the successor operator in the syntactic domain
is the collection § of syntactic operators ¾i. These operators are in general partial.
1The advantage of this format is that if ¾ is just the ﬁrst argument of ½, the arity of ½ would vary if
there are syntactic operators of different arities.
2IambyandlargeusingtheframeworkproposedbyWilfridHodgesandusede.g. inHodges2001,
Westerståhl 2004, and Pagin 2003.
3The set of well-formed terms T is deﬁned inductively from a ﬁnite set A of primi-
tive expressions by means of the syntactic operations ¾i of §. Hence, the semantic
function ¹ differs in one respect from arithmetic functions in that in general the
domain is deﬁned by more than one construction type.
The semantic function differs in one other important respect from an arith-
metic function, since it maps entities between domains, from a syntactic to an
ontic or conceptual domain of meanings (I shall refer to this as the conceptual
domain). Therefore, to have a recursive semantic function, we need not only re-
cursion over syntax, but also recursion over the conceptual domain. In order for
this to make sense, we must regard the meaning domain M as being inductively
deﬁned from a ﬁnite set B of basic meanings, by means of a collection ¡ of basic
meaningcompositionfunctions°i. Inthiscasetheelements°i of¡correspondto
the successor operation of arithmetic. New functions can be deﬁned from B and
¡ by means of function composition, primitive recursion and minimization. Let ¡
be the closure of ¡ under these operations.3
The situation is in fact more complicated, since what corresponds to the com-
position functions in the compositional case, the elements of ¡, will take argu-
ments both in the syntactic and the conceptual domain (but their values will be
in M). I shall refer to them as mixed composition functions. The domain of these
functionsistheunionU ÆT[M ofthesyntacticandtheconceptualdomains. The
semantic function ¹ is then deﬁned by simultaneous recursion over T and M.
For a function to be recursive over U, it is then required that it be a constant
function with a basic meaning as value, a projection function, a member of § or
¡, or deﬁned from these by means of function composition, primitive recursion
or minimization. In arithmetic, the minimization Mn[f ](x1,...,xn) is a function
that that gives y as value if y is the smallest x such that f (x1,...,xn,x) Æ 0, with
f deﬁned for all x1,...,xn,x with x Ç y, and undeﬁned if no such number exists.
Since the syntactic and conceptual domains in general contain several minimal
elements and several generating operations, there is in general no direct analogy.
Rather, we would have to ﬁx one by means of stipulations such as lexicographic
3 I shall let the variables ‘°i’ etc. vary over the elements of ¡.
4orderings. Since this would be arbitrary and since minimization has not played
any role in any semantic system I know of, minimization will be ignored. Instead
we will consider the counterparts to primitive recursion.
The function composition ingredient generates new functions in accordance
with composition equations of the following general format:
(FC) f (~ x)Æ g(h1(~ x),...,hn(~ x))
where ‘~ x’ is short for ‘x1,...,xm’. Here the function f is deﬁned by composition
from the functions g,h1,...,hn.
The primitive recursion ingredient instantiate recursion equations of the fol-
lowing format for the application of the semantic function ¹:
(Rec) i) For each simple term t 2 A there is a function °t 2 ¡ such that ¹(t) Æ
°t(t)
ii) Foranyn andoperation¾i 2§ofarityn thereisafunction°i 2¡such
that for all terms t1,...,tn, if ¹ is deﬁned for ¾i(t1,...,tn), then
¹(¾i(t1,...,tn))Æ°i(t1,...,tn,¹(t1),...,¹(tn))
Here, it is immediate from the recursive clause, ii), that ¹ is directly deﬁned by
recursion over T. If °i is also deﬁned by means of primitive recursion, this will be
recursion over M, or over both T and M.
We can note that the requirement of clause i) is usually met by a simple list of
the values or ¹ for each simple term t. Secondly, we can observe that the require-
ment in clause ii) that °i 2¡, i.e. that °i be recursive overU, imposes a restriction
that is not imposed in (PC). Thirdly, the fact that the functions °i take the syntac-
tic terms t1,...,tn themselves as arguments, has the effect that the compositional
substitution laws need not hold. For
°i(t1,t2,¹(t1),¹(t2))
5may well differ from
°i(t1,t3,¹(t1),¹(t3))
even if ¹(t2)Æ¹(t3). Hence, recursiveness does not entail compositionality.4
The concept of (effective) computability is closely connected to that of recur-
siveness. Intuitively, for a function f to be effectively computable is for there to
be an effective/mechanical procedure p such that for any argument x for which f
is deﬁned, p as applied to x terminates after a ﬁnite number of steps with giving
the value of f for x. The paradigm of effective computability is a Turing machine.
Arithmetical recursive functions are Turing computable, and Turing computable
arithmeticfunctionsarerecursive(seee.g. Boolos,Jeffrey,andBurgess2002,chap-
ters7-8). Theclaimthatallarithmeticfunctionsthatarecomputableinthegeneral
intuitive sense are recursive is known as Church’s Thesis.
When we move from arithmetic to the ﬁeld of natural language semantics, we
can satisfy demands of intuitive computability by ensuring that the functions in-
volved are Turing computable. This can be shown directly, in part by showing how
the formal substitution operations induced by the recursion equations can be ex-
ecuted.
With these basic concepts in place, I turn to the reason for justifying composi-
tionality by appeal to communication.
3. From learnability to communication
Almostallofthestandardargumentsfortheclaimthatnaturallanguagesarecom-
positionalsufferfromsevereﬂaws.5 I’lltakethelearnability argumentastheprime
example. This argument was given by Donald Davidson in 1965. The argument,
applied to some language L, can be presented as follows:
(LA) a) There is an inﬁnite set M of meanings.
b) Each disambiguated expression in L has at most one meaning.
4As pointed out in Werning 2005 and developed in Pagin and Westerståhl 2008, we can have a
natural recursive semantics for quotation that is not compositional. An example can be found in
Potts 2007. Cf. the present section 8.
5 For a brief survey of arguments for compositionality and a critical discussion, see Pagin and
Westerståhl 2008.
6c) For every possible context c, every element in M is the meaning in c
of some expression in L.
d) Humans can learn at most ﬁnitely many basic expression-meaning
pairs.
e) Humans can learn L.
f) Hence, L has a compositional semantics.6
The main idea of this argument is that since it is impossible to learn the meanings
of all expressions if all expression-meaning pairs are basic, some have to be non-
basic, i.e. derived, and if the meaning of an expression is derivable, the language
must be compositional.
There are two main problems with this argument. The ﬁrst problem is the
premise (LAc), for it is a very strong assumption that there are inﬁnitely many
meanings expressed, in any context, by sentences of a natural language, say En-
glish. Sinceatanytime t,speakersofthelanguagehaveusedatmostﬁnitelymany
sentences, it follows that there are (inﬁnitely many) sentences that have not been
used but are nonetheless meaningful.7 On what basis do we claim that sentences
that no speaker has used is already endowed with a meaning, waiting to be cor-
rectly computed by the speakers of English? The most natural justiﬁcation of this
claim would be that English has a compositional semantics, for with such a se-
mantics, the meanings of unused sentences may already be determined. But with
such a justiﬁcation of (LAc), the (LA) argument involves a petitio principii. We
need either a different justiﬁcation for (LAc), or a replacement of (LA).
The second problem with (LA) is that the condition of allowing for meanings
ofsomeexpressionstobederivable doesnotrequireacompositionalsemantics. It
does require a computable semantics. As we saw above, however, a function may
be recursive (and hence computable) without being compositional. The learn-
6Often some of the elements in this arguments are slurred over: It is not enough to say that there
are inﬁnitely many meaningful sentences to be learned, for if every sentence has the same meaning,
thetaskoflearningthemeaningofeverysentenceisnotthathard. Therefore,weneedthecondition
thatthereareinﬁnitelymanyexpressiblemeanings. Butfurther, itisnotenoughtosaythatthereare
inﬁnitely many meanings that can be expressed, for with the single sentence ‘I am here’, inﬁnitely
many propositions can be expressed, by using it in different contexts.
7 The alternative premise, instead of (LAa), that M is ﬁnite but larger than the set of sentences
used at t, would work as well, and have the same problem.
7ability requirement therefore, barring the ﬁrst problem, provides an argument for
computability, and therefore (assuming Church’s Thesis in the domain of seman-
tics) recursiveness, but not an argument for compositionality. The same problem
afﬂicts several related arguments.8
If we turn from learnability to communication, the ﬁrst problem disappears.
The reason is that in each case of linguistic communication, the speaker asso-
ciatesapropositionalcontentwiththesentencesheusesandthehearerassociates
a propositional content with that same sentence (on that occasion), and there is
or there is not agreement between them in the sense that they associate the same
content or at least contents that are sufﬁciently similar for communication to suc-
ceed. Now there is a question of what explains why speaker and hearer associate
the same or similar contents with the same sentences. We need not assume that
there is any correct or incorrect association of content with a new sentence; all we
need care about is the coincidence.
Compositionalityentersthepicturebecauseithelpsexplainingtherateofsuc-
cess in linguistic communication when the sentence used or the content commu-
nicated is new. The ﬁrst to emphasize this role for compositionality was Gottlob
Frege:
It is astonishing what language can do. With a few syllables it can express
an incalculable number of thoughts, so that even a thought grasped by a ter-
restrial being for the very ﬁrst time can be put into a form of words which
will be understood by somebody to whom the thought is entirely new. This
would be impossible, were we not able to distinguish parts in the thought
corresponding to the parts of a sentence, so that the structure of the sen-
tence serves as an image of the structure of the thought (Frege 1923, opening
paragraph).
8 Jeff Pelletier (1994) similarly argues that it is enough if a semantics is what he calls grounded.
Being grounded in Pelletier’s sense is somewhat looser than being recursive: what corresponds to
recursion equations in Pelletier’s examples allows a clause like ¹(¾(t)) Æ r(¹(¯(t))), for some func-
tion r, where ¯(t) may be a successor of t. In general, derivations with such equations are not guar-
anteed to terminate. According to Pelletier, it is enough if they in fact do, and only if they do is the
semantics grounded. As already shown, however, ordinary recursiveness is enough for exemplifying
a semantics that is computable but non-compositional.
8This passage is remarkably rich in content. Frege correctly points to the inﬁnite
expressive power of a language (rather than its inﬁnite syntax) as the important
feature. Frege also draws attention to communication as the phenomenon that
is crucial for the systematic nature of semantics. In this context, communication
hasthreefeaturesthatcontrastwithlearnability. First, communicationrelatestwo
speakers who each has an independent interpretation of a sentence. As we saw,
this is an advantage compared with the learnability argument.
Secondly, communication relates a speaker and a hearer, with different roles.
The speaker is to ﬁnd a suitable sentence to express a Thought, while the hearer is
to ﬁnd a suitable Thought for interpreting the uttered sentence, and this asymme-
try demands more of semantics than interpretation does by itself.9 Frege’s main
claimisthattheabilitytocommunicatenewthoughtswouldnotbepossiblewith-
out an isomorphism between the sentence and the thought.10
Thereareseveralproblemswiththisclaim,butthemostrelevantproblemcon-
cerns computability. In order that the hearer can compute the right content from
the(parsed)expression,allweneedisthatthesemanticfunctionisrecursive. Why
would we also want an isomorphism, or that it be compositional?
Thisquestionbringsustothe thirdrespectinwhichcommunicationcontrasts
with learnability: communication takes place in real time and under tight time
constraints, while learnability has no temporal signiﬁcance at all and sentence
understanding as such (as opposed to the processing of tokens) is not a real time
process (at best, the resulting end state of understanding can be assigned a time
point).
During oral communication, speaker and hearer have to ﬁgure out, respec-
tively, what expression to use and what it means, on-line, at a high speed. The
complexity of the cognitive task therefore becomes crucial: the complexity of the
articulation and interpretation tasks cannot be too high, on pain of making our
9This idea is developed in detail in Pagin 2003.
10The isomorphism requirement is stronger than the compositionality requirement in the respect
that the semantic function must be one-one, while compositionality only requires many-one. It also
requires meanings to be structured (since otherwise there is automatically an isomorphism), while
compositionality does not. Taken literally, it is in another respect weaker: that for every sentence
s there is an isomorphism between s and its meaning does not entail that there is one semantic
function ¹ that for every sentence s is an isomorphism between s and ¹(s).
9near-immediate communication impossible. Computability in principle does not
put any upper bound on the (ﬁnite) complexity of the computation task. In order
to secure a reasonable complexity, we must look for some other property.
Thegeneralidea,thenistojustifyfurtherpropertiesofthesemanticsbyappeal
their role in minimizing complexity. It turns out that compositionality has a role
to play in that enterprise. First, we shall need to discuss the cognitive relevance of
computational complexity measures.
4. Computational complexity and cognitive tasks
The speaker has the task of articulation, i.e. of ﬁnding and uttering a suitable lin-
guistic expression for conveying her thought content to the hearer, and the hearer
has that of interpretation, i.e. of ﬁnding a suitable thought content to associate
with the expression uttered. Here, I shall focus on the task of the hearer.
We want to know ultimately what properties a semantic function should have
so as to be least taxing for the hearer to compute. To this end we want to provide
some measure of the complexity of the task. That measure will have to be math-
ematical in character. But this already introduces a risk of misrepresenting the
processes. For whether a certain interpretation task s is more or less complex than
a task s0 depends not only on obvious differences in some size or other, but also
on what happens to be easier for us, human language users, given our cognitive
architecture. To take an example from the literature, consider the sentences
(1) a. The reporter who attacked the senator admitted the error.
b. The reporter who the senator attacked admitted the error.
(example taken from Gibson 1998, 2). It is well-known in psycholinguistics that
certain subordinate constructions are more difﬁcult to process than others. Typ-
ically, we ﬁnd subject-extracted relative clauses, as in (1a), easier to process than
object-extracted relative clauses, as in (1b). There is no obvious mathematical rea-
son why this should be so. The tree structures of the two complementizer phrases
in (1) appear to be of about the same complexity, with an equal number of nodes,
and resulting from one another by the interchange of the two NP nodes, as shown
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Figure 1: Complementizer phrases of (1).
in Figure 1. If anything, the a) tree is intuitively more complex, since it it has ﬁve
levels while b) has four. A proposed explanation (cf. Gibson 1998) is that the dis-
tance between the relative pronoun ‘who’ and its corresponding trace ti is greater
in b) than in a). Processing from left to right involves keeping elements in mind
that will be tied to other elements later on, and so the longer it takes before a rela-
tive pronoun can be anchored to a position in the subordinate clause, the heavier
short term memory is taxed.
Whether the explanation is right or wrong, the phenomenon exempliﬁes the
general fact that results that depend on mere intuitive assessments of mathemat-
ical complexity are subject to correction by empirical studies. Nevertheless, the
difﬁcultyinthiscasecanbemodeledandmeasuredbyamathematicalproperty—
the left-to-right distance (in the tree/term) between the relative pronoun and the
coordinated empty position in the relative clause. That property might seem to
be completely unrelated to compositionality, since the left-right order of expres-
sions, as opposed to the constituency order, is in principle irrelevant to the struc-
ture of the underlying syntactic term. However, minimizing left-to-right distance
between a surface element and the last further surface element needed to pro-
cess it, is an example of a general complexity principle that John Hawkins (e.g.
in Hawkins 2003, 144) has called Maximize On-Line Processing. According to that
principle, grammatical systems of natural languages tend to be organized so as
to minimize the effort of processing elements on-line, i.e. when and where they
11are encountered in an utterance or a text. As we shall see, minimizing general
complexity is closely connected with maximizing on-line processing. The exam-
ple suggests that we have reason to be optimistic about the cognitive relevance of
general computational measures of complexity.
5. Complexity and efﬁciency
In computational complexity theory, three types of measure have been studied
extensively, all deﬁned in terms of Turing machines:
The time complexity of a problem P (relative to a way of describing P) with
respect to an algorithm A, is the maximum number of computation steps that are
neededforaTuringmachinethatimplements A tosolveaprobleminstanceofthe
same size as P (cf. Garey and Johnson 1979, 6, 26).
The space complexity of a problem P (relative to a way of describing P) with
respect to an algorithm A, is the maximum number of distinct tape squares visited
by a Turing machine that implements A to solve a problem instance of the same
size as P (cf. Garey and Johnson 1979, 170).
The Kolmogorov complexity of a problem P (relative to a way of describing P)
is the size (relative to a linear encoding of Turing machines) of the smallest Turing
machine needed to solve P (cf. Li and Vitányi 1997, 93-98).
In these contexts, a “problem” is usually a problem type, and what is solved in
each particular case is an instance of that problem type. Such a problem type is
e.g. The Traveling Salesman: a salesman is to visit a number of cities exactly once
and then return home, and the task is to ﬁnd a visiting order that minimizes the
total distance traveled. The number of cities is the size of the instance.
Depending on the choice of complexity measure and on the choice of method
for solving problems of a chosen type, a particular problem instance gets assigned
a natural number as the complexity of that instance, numbering e.g. the squares
that a chosen Turing machine has visited for computing the solution. One is in-
terested not only and not primarily in the complexity of individual instances, but
in the maximal complexity of instances of the same size: given e.g. a number of
cities to visit (disregarding further information), what is the maximal number of
12steps needed to determine the best order? Given a problem type P and a method
Ã, one is therefore interested in the complexity function CP,Ã from natural num-
bers to natural numbers which, for a given argument k gives as value the maximal
complexity of P-instances of size k.
SupposewecanholdP constant. Wecanthensimplyassociateeachmethod Ã
withacomplexityfunctionCÃ. Wheneachmethodisassociatedwithacomplexity
function, we can compare methods with respect to efﬁciency: if for all k it holds
thatCÃ(k)ÇC²(k), thenwecansaythatmethodÃismoreefﬁcient thanmethod².
Ingeneral,theefﬁciencycomparisonislesslessstraightforward,sinceonemethod
may be more efﬁcient than another only in the long run. The most natural way of
capturing this idea is to require that from some size onwards, the sum of the C
values are lower for the one than for the other:
(EC) Ã is more efﬁcient than ² iff there is an n such that
8k Èn
"
k X
iÆ1
C²(i)¡CÃ(i) È 0
#
We are interested in ﬁnding out the properties of those interpretation methods,
i.e. semantic functions, that are most efﬁcient in this sense. As we shall see below,
however, this comparison is signiﬁcant only for large differences.
6. Measures of complexity
We turn now to the question selecting an appropriate complexity measure. Which
of the three aforementioned types of complexity are relevant to an intuitive mea-
sure of the difﬁculty of the cognitive task? Time complexity appears to be most
directly relevant, since considerations of time pressure motivated looking at com-
plexity in the ﬁrst place. The general idea of time complexity is that we count the
number of steps that have to be taken for completing a process. It is plausible to
assumethatbyandlarge,anincreaseofthenumberofstepsrequiredintheformal
computation corresponds to an increase of the real time needed for human pro-
cessing. I shall assume so. Hence, we will in the ﬁrst place want to minimize time
complexity of individual tasks, and therefore to maximize efﬁciency of semantic
13functions with respect to time complexity.
Thenextquestionstoanswerare: Whatisthecharacteroftherelevantproblem
type? How do we measure the size of an instance? What constitutes an individual
step of the computation process?
It would very natural at ﬁrst to take maximizing efﬁciency to consist in ﬁnding
the most efﬁcient semantic function for a given language L and a given domain M
of meanings, where L is understood purely syntactically. That is, measure the size
of the problem instance as the size of the term, and look for the longest computa-
tion needed for a term of that size. But although this question makes sense, there
is a good reason to look at the issue differently. For with some choices of L and M,
semantic interpretation becomes intractable, whatever the semantic function. To
see this, consider the following example of Lisa.
We have a language L consisting of ® and the successor operator 0 as basic ele-
ments. So L consists of the terms ®,®0,®00 etc. Then we have a conceptual domain
consisting of the object l (Lisa) and the two conceptual functions f (father) and m
(mother). So M consists of l,m(l), f (l),m(m(l)),m(f (l)), f (m(l)), f (f (l)) etc. Let
thesize ofanobjectofeitherdomainconsistinitsnumberofbasicelements(basic
object plus number of function/operator occurrences), and let the size n of a do-
main be the number of elements of at most size n it contains. The growth rate of
the domain is a rate of increase of the function g(n) that maps a number n on the
number ofelements ofdomainwithsize n or lower. In theseterms, we have a con-
ceptual domain with a growth rate of g(nÅ1) Æ 2g(n)Å1 and a syntactic domain
with a growth rate of g(nÅ1)Æ g(n)Å1.
In order that the semantic function ¹ for each element m in M up to size n
maps a term t on m, 2nÅ1 ¡1 distinct terms will be needed, since there are that
many elements of M of size n or lower. Therefore, there will be at least one ele-
ment mi and one term tj of L such that ¹(tj) Æ mi and the size of tj is 2nÅ1 ¡1
or greater. Assuming that exactly one computation step is needed for processing
eachelementofaterm t,atleast2nÅ1¡1stepsareneededtocompute tj.11 Hence,
11 This assumption is made for ease of exposition. It does not matter much. It will in any case hold
thatthereisaﬁnitenumberk suchthatinthelongrun,atmostk elementscanbecomputedineach
step. Then there is still exponential growth.
14the maximal number of steps needed to process a term referring to an object of a
certainsizegrowsexponentially withthesizeoftheobject,regardlessofthechoice
of semantic function. In terms of computational complexity theory, using L for re-
ferring to M in the Lisa example is a strictly intractable task. When tasks are con-
sidered tractable, the increase in time complexity (number of steps needed) is at
most a polynomial function.
More precisely, we get the intractability result if we regard the problem type
as the type of understanding the expression of a concept, for then the size of a
problem instance is the size of that concept. If by contrast we regard the prob-
lem type as that of processing a term, then the size of the problem instance is the
size of the term. The time complexity function, under the assumption above, is
then simply x: as many steps are needed as there are elements in the term. From
that point of view, the semantic function appears very efﬁcient. For the same con-
ceptual domain M we could have a more appropriate language L0 and a semantic
function ¹0 mapping L0 on M that would require, say, terms that are twice as large
as the concepts they are mapped on. With the same assumption of one step per
element of the term, ¹ would be as efﬁcient as ¹0 if the problem type is that of
processing terms, but exponentially less efﬁcient if the problem type is that of ar-
rivingatcontents. Thelatterisclearlywhatiscognitivelymorerelevant: LÅ¹form
an intractably cumbersome combination for talking about or expressing M, while
the alternative L0Å¹0 would be manageable. The upshot is that the problem type
should be that of interpreting expressions of content, and that hence the measure
of the size of the instance of that problem simply is the size of the content. That
is the invariant factor in the comparison between methods.12 We have to take ac-
count not only of the efﬁciency of the mapping from code to concepts, but also of
the efﬁciency of the encoding itself, i.e. the size of the code.13
12A further reason not to use the term size as the size of the problem instance is that we can make
terms arbitrarily much larger by throwing in junk constituents that are not needed for the semantics
and therefore do not add to computation complexity. With a lot of junk in the terms, a semantic
function can appear to be more efﬁcient, which is again counterintuitive.
13 This aspect of the issue shows the similarity with questions of efﬁcient encoding handled in
Mathematical Information Theory, as originated in Shannon 1949. There are also important differ-
ences, however. An encoding E is efﬁcient in the information theoretic sense if the average rate of
information sent over an information channel and encoded by E is high. In that context, a signal
conveys more information if the fact that it reports is less probable. States of affairs that are highly
15But how do we measure the size of contents? Does it make sense to say that
one concept or one proposition is larger than another? There is no immediate way
of making a relevant sense of that idea, but it does not matter so much. Compu-
tations can anyway not be deﬁned over contents, only over symbols. What we can
and must do, then, is to measure the size of representations of content. We shall
need a formal language where we give canonical representations of conceptual
contents. With such a formal, unambiguous language of canonical representa-
tions, we can again count the number of symbols in its expressions for determin-
ing the relevant size of contents represented.
The ﬁnal question concerns the nature of the computation steps that are to be
counted. As mentioned above, standard time complexity takes the number of op-
erations of Turing machines as the measure. If that were the choice, we would
have to settle for some particular kind of Turing machine, whether a standard
single-tape machine with a tape that is inﬁnite in both directions, or something
else. There is no uniquely right choice, and no absolute measure. Turing machine
operations will involve steps needed in order to ﬁnd the relevant information (on
other tape squares) and moving symbols in order to make room for others etc,
and how many such operations are needed will depend on the choice of machine.
Therefore, these operations are to some extent arbitrary, and to that extent less
essential to the complexity measure.
There is a natural alternative, which is to employ the equation system used for
deﬁning a function also as a method for computing the function. Take as a simple
example, Donald Davidson’s Annette (Davidson 1967, 17-18):
(2) i) Ref(‘Annette’) = Annette.
probable will in the long run occur more often, and should be reported by means of shorter codes.
So the efﬁciency of an encoding depends on the matching between the distribution of lengths of
codes and the distribution of probabilities, over the same possible states of affairs.
In the present case, the questions of truth or falsity of sentences used or the probabilities of facts
reported on, do not arise. We are only concerned with the expressive power and the efﬁciency of the
interpretation. In the information theoretic case, questions of efﬁcient encoding arise even if there
is only a small ﬁnite number of signal types (sentences) used over and over. In the present context,
having only a ﬁnite number of sentences would reduce the interpretation problem to triviality, since
then the meaning of all sentences could be given by a ﬁnite list. This would reduce the total number
of processing steps needed for any sentence to exactly 1.
16ii) Ref(‘the father of’_t) = the father of Ref(t).
This simple deﬁnition provides a method for deriving the interpretation of ‘the
father of the father of the father of Annette’ in four steps of substitution. Let ‘F’ be
the object language father operator and ‘F’ its analogue in the meta-language, and
let ‘a’ be the object language name of Annette. Then we have in four steps with
the semantic function ¹a:
(3) ¹a(F(F(F(a))))
ÆF(¹a(F(F(a))))
ÆF(F(¹a(F(a))))
ÆF(F(F(¹a(a))))
ÆF(F(F(Annette)))
where (what corresponds to) the second clause of (2) is applied three times and
the ﬁrst clause once.
Each derivation step in (3) is a substitution step. Each substitution is per-
formed in accordance with equations in (2). These equations are applied only
for substitution from left to right: an instance of the left-hand side is replaced by
the corresponding instance of the right-hand side. This makes the system into a
so-called term rewriting system. Term rewriting systems are sets of rewrite rules.
Rewrite rules apply to terms and license formal substitutions of/in those terms.
Rewriterulescancontainvariables,inwhichcaseaninstance oftheleft-hand-side
is allowed to be transformed to the corresponding instance of the right-hand-side.
Clause ii) of (2) can be regarded as such a rule, with the variable t occurring once
on each side. Relative to some rewriting system R, when no rule of R applies to a
term u, u is said to be in normal form. The little derivation in (3) transforms the
initial term ‘¹a(F(F(F(a))))’ to its normal form ‘F(F(F(Annette)))’ in four steps.
Transforming terms to normal form by means of a sequence of rewrite rule
applications is a completely general form of computation. It has been shown that
anyboth-wayinﬁniteone-tapeTuringmachinecanbesimulatedbyatermrewrit-
ing system such that each rule of the rewriting system corresponds to a machine
17transition and each machine transition is represented by at least one rewrite rule
(cf. Baader and Nipkow 1998, 94-97). In virtue of this relation it is not only very
convenient but also well motivated to use the count of rewrite rule applications as
a measure of time complexity.
Then, for each non-normal rewriting term s, we consider the shortest deriva-
tion by which s is normalized. Only normal terms correspond to full interpreta-
tion, i.e. to our representations of the world; other terms only have a role in de-
riving the normal terms. Let input terms of the rewriting system be terms of the
form ‘¹(t)’, with t a syntactic term. For a normal term s we consider the short-
est derivation by which some input term ¹(t) is normalized to s.14 Let that be the
term complexity CtR(s) of s relative to R. The time complexity CR(k) for the size k
relative to the system R is then the maximal CtR(s) such that s has size k.
With this much of background, I turn to characterizing the main ideas about
minimizing time complexity.
7. Minimizing complexity
In this section and the next I shall very brieﬂy sketch the ideas and the reason-
ing that lead up to the results about compositionality and complexity. Because of
space limitations, the presentation must be largely informal, and full precision is
not possible here.15
In general, a rewriting system R is a set of rewrite rules of the form
F(¡ ! x ) ! G(¡ ! y )
(where the arrows over the variables indicate that it is a sequence of variables).16
An example would be
h(x1)bx2 ! g(x1,c)bd
where ‘b’, ‘c’ and ‘d’ are constants. A derivation is a sequence of applications
14There need not be any longest derivation, since it is possible that there is no upper bound to the
size of terms that reduce to the same normal form.
15It is formally developed in Pagin 2008b.
16For an excellent introduction to term rewriting, see Baader and Nipkow 1998.
18where a term (often a subterm of a larger term) that is an instance of the lhs (left-
hand-side) is replaced (in the containing term, in case it is a subterm) by the cor-
responding instance of the rhs. An instance of term s is any term s0 resulting from
s by uniform substitution by terms for rewrite variables. Thus, ‘h(s7)bf (s9)’ is an
instance of the lhs above.
A rewriting system R is said to terminate iff every derivation eventually leads
to a term in normal form (to which no rule applies). R is said to be conﬂuent iff it
holds for any terms s1,s2,s3 such that s2 and s3 both can be derived from s1, that
there is a term s4 such that s4 can be derived from both s2 and s3. R is convergent
iff R both terminates and is conﬂuent.
Not all term rewriting systems terminate and not all are conﬂuent, and neither
propertyisingeneraldecidable. However,thesystemsweareconcernedwith,that
satisfy the format of primitive recursion equations, involve substitutions of a very
restricted kind. It is straightforward to show that these systems are convergent.
Furthermore, it can be shown that every derivation terminates with a canon-
ical term. Given that the set of canonical terms is the fragment of the formal lan-
guage that represents the conceptual domain, every derivation ends with a term
representing the conceptual domain. This means that every such rewriting sys-
tem, whentherulesarestatedasequations, hastheformatfordeﬁningasemantic
function.
We can call these systems ‘¹ systems’. A ¹ system R for a language L is then
such that for every (meaningful) grammatical term t of L, there is a rule r 2R such
thattherewriteterm‘¹(t)’instantiatesthelhsofr. Andagrammaticaltermoccurs
in an instance of the lhs of a rule only as a subterm of a larger rewrite term, since
it can only occur as an argument to a function.
¹ systems have four properties that are crucial for complexity. A ﬁfth property
is peculiar to direct ¹ systems:
(RS) a. Every ¹ system has a ﬁnite number of rules.
b. No term in the formal language of the ¹ system (as opposed to terms
occurring in the rule formulations) contains any rewrite variables.
c. For any rule r of the ¹ system, the set of rewrite variables on the rhs of
19r is a subset of the set of rewrite variables occurring on the lhs of r.
d. In a ¹ system R, no rewrite term containing a terminal symbol instan-
tiates the lhs of any rule r0 2R.
e. Every rule of a direct ¹ system is an output rule. In an output rule a
terminal symbol occurs on the rhs, and any symbol on the rhs that
does not occur on the lhs is a terminal symbol.
Properties(RSc)and(RSd)havethecombinedeffectthatterminalsymbolscannot
be produced by means of instantiating variables. Any terminal symbol occurring
in a term is produced by means of a rule where it is explicitly used on the rhs. At
most ﬁnitely many terminal symbols can occur on the rhs of any rule. Since the
rule system is ﬁnite, there is a largest number w of terminal symbol occurrences
thatcanbeproducedinany single rule application. Thisis theMaxAppnumberof
the system. It is immediate that the smallest number of application steps needed
produce a term s of size k in a ¹ system R is [k/!], where ! is the MaxApp num-
ber of R and [z] is the smallest whole number at least as great as z. Since there
are inﬁnitely many terms of normal form, the ratio [k/!] will be an upper limit of
efﬁciency in the long run. Hence, no ¹ rule system R can be faster than having a
linear time complexity functionCR.
Therealefﬁciencymaybemuchlower. Ifrulesthatproducenewnon-terminal
symbols are present, the upper limit of efﬁciency may be an exponential function
of the size of the canonical terms. If the rule system is direct, every new symbol
on the rhs of a rule is a terminal symbol. In virtue of property (RSd) of ¹ systems,
that term cannot itself be an argument, i.e. instantiate the lhs of a rule. Only its
proper subterms can. In ¹ systems, substitutions are only performed on subterms
that do not contain terminal symbols. Because of this, ¹ systems that are direct
are guaranteed to transform terms to normal form in an incremental fashion, in
each step replacing non-terminal by terminal symbols, until only only terminal
symbols remain.
Let the MinApp of a ¹ system be the minimal number of terminal symbol oc-
currences that are produced by any single rule application. Hence, for a direct sys-
tem R, MinApp(R)¸1. This means that for a direct rule system R, we can estimate
20the complexity functionCR as
[k/!]·CR(k)·[k/®]
where ! is MaxApp(R) and ® is MinApp(R). Since ®¸1, it follows thatCR(k)·k if
R is a direct rule system. I shall say that systems with such a complexity function
are maximally time efﬁcient.
Clearly, since there is no ﬁnite upper bound the value of !, there is no highest
efﬁciency value. It still makes sense to speak of maximal time efﬁciency, for the
reason that rewriting computation can be sped-up by more than any ﬁnite factor.
Where we have a system R¹ that computes a function ¹ we can devise a system
R0
¹ that computes the same function ¹ at roughly twice the speed. We do this by
creating more complex rules, i.e. rules that apply to larger terms. Such rules are
more specialized, and hence more such rules are needed for having an equivalent
system.17
We have already seen that a direct rule system is maximally time efﬁcient. Be-
cause of the possibility of speed-up, the simple converse, that a system with max-
imal time efﬁciency is direct, doesn’t hold. We can, however, deﬁne a notion max-
imal efﬁciency simpliciter in a way that excludes ad hoc speed-up features. This
allows proving the following claim:
(ED) If R is maximally efﬁcient, then R is direct.
Wehaveconnectedefﬁciencywithdirectness. Thesecondmajorstepwillbeto
connect the directness of a rule system with the nature of the semantic functions
that be deﬁned by the corresponding equation systems.
8. Compositionality and minimal complexity
In order to see how minimal complexity connects with the question of composi-
tionality, we must inquire about the form of maximally efﬁcient systems. It can be
17 This corresponds to speed-up transformations of Turing machines. For a given Turing machine
M we can e.g. devise a machine M0 that is twice as fast by letting the new one process two tape
squares at a time (cf. Hartmanis and Stearns 1965).
21shown that
(DH) If R is a maximally efﬁcient rule system, and r is a rule of R with a lhs of
the form ¹(¾(x1,...,xn)), then the rhs has the form ½(¹(x1),...,¹(xn)).
Proof. Suppose for reductio that R is a maximally efﬁcient ¹ system that contains
a rule r of the form
(4) ¹(¾(t1,...,tn)) ! p(t1,...,tn,¹(t1),...,¹(tn))
where p issimpleorcomplex. Supposewehaveaninstance q oftherhsofr. Since
p is a simple or complex new symbol and R is maximally efﬁcient, and therefore
by (ED) direct, by (RSe) p can only consist of terminal symbols. Hence, by (RSd),
neither q, nor any subterm q0 of q that contains any constituent of p, instantiates
thelhsofanyruler0 ofR. Onlythe¹(ti)orthe ti do. But¹systemsdon’thaverules
where the grammatical terms themselves instantiate the lhs. And since the ti are
not themselves terminal symbols, q contains non-terminal symbols that cannot
be eliminated, which is impossible.18
Instead, the rules for complex terms in a maximally efﬁcient ¹ system must be
of the form
(5) ¹(¾(t1,...,tn)) ! p(¹(t1),...,¹(tn))
This means that the corresponding equation format for deﬁning a semantic func-
tion is
(6) ¹(¾(t1,...,tn))Æ p(¹(t1),...,¹(tn))
which conforms to the homomorphism format of compositionality.
The format is, however, stricter than what compositionality requires, since p is
requiredtobeasimpleorcomplexterminal(operator)symbol. Hence,eitherp isa
18Inordertokeeptheproofsimple,itmusthereberequiredthatatomictermsaredistinctfromthe
corresponding atomic expressions. Otherwise quotation will produce examples where some atomic
grammatical terms in fact are terminal symbols, but this is an inessential complication.
22simpleoperatororelseapolynomialterm g(h1(~ x),...,hn(~ x))over simpleoperators
and(rewrite)variables. Ifwelookatitasaspeciﬁcationofasemanticfunction,this
means that either p denotes a simple function on the conceptual domain which
therefore belongs to the set ¡ of basic meaning composition functions, or else it
denotesafunctiondeﬁnablefrombasicmeaningcompositionfunctionsbymeans
of function composition, i.e. the schema (FC) Let’s say that semantic functions
that comply with this restriction are polynomially compositional. 19
If a semantic function is polynomially compositional, it is speciﬁable by a di-
rectrulesystem,andhencebyamaximallytimeefﬁcientrulesystem. Totheextent
wecanspeakofasemanticfunctionitselfashavingadegreeofcomplexity,wemay
say that such a semantic function has minimal time complexity. It does not hold
for compositional semantics in general, only for the polynomial kind.
The converse does not follow immediately, however.20 The most important
reason is that we can have other functions from terms to values that behave well
with respect to computational complexity. If we add a quotation operator to a
language L, we will make another function relevant: the function V from terms to
the expressions of L. Somewhat oversimpliﬁed, with · as quotation operator, we
have
(7) ¹(·(t))Æ‘V (t)’
(this is a simpliﬁed formulation; assume here that substitutions within quotes are
allowed). For familiar reasons, clause (7) induces non-compositionality: V (t) 6Æ
V (u) even if ¹(t) Æ ¹(u). However, this need have no adverse effect on time com-
plexity. If the V function itself is a homomorphism, so that for every operator ¾
there is some simple or polynomial expression operator ² such that for any terms
19 Interestingly, this is the intuitively simplest and most natural version of compositionality. It
imposes a strong similarity between the syntactic and conceptual algebras. Theo Janssen (1986,
1997) has insisted on the restriction to polynomially deﬁned algebras for the intermediate logical
language, in cases when the semantics is deﬁned indirectly, via translation into an intermediary
logical language, although for quite different reasons. The restriction has been criticized by Herman
Hendriks (2001) as not essential to compositionality and as imposing conditions that are sometimes
impossible to meet. The present considerations agree with Hendriks in principle, but also provide
separate reasons why approximating polynomial compositionality is nevertheless desirable.
20One reason for this that I shall not elaborate on is that it follows only if the meta-language itself
has a well-behaved semantics.
23t1,...,tn for which ¾ is deﬁned it holds that
(8) V (¾(t1,...,tn))Æ²(V (t1),...,V (tn))
then semantic processing can continue with the same time efﬁciency as before.
To accommodate a quotation operator, we would need to add expressions to the
conceptual domain, so that they can serve as values to the semantic function, but
this is not in itself a problem.
Infact,thesituationgeneralizes. Let’ssaythataset¢offunctionsfromthesyn-
tactic domain T to the (enriched) conceptual domain M is jointly-compositional
just in case, for any ±2¢ and any operator ¾ that there is a meaning composition
function ½ and functions ±1,...,±n 2 ¢, not necessarily distinct, such that for all
terms t1,...,tn (with ± is deﬁned for ¾(t1,...,tn)) it holds that
(9) ±(¾(t1,...,tn))Æ½(±1(t1),...,±n(tn))
If in each clause of this kind in the semantic system ½ is polynomial, time com-
plexity will still be minimal, since the relevant ±i 2 ¢ are read off from the clause,
andneednotbefurthercomputed. Thesystemisnotcompositionalinthenormal
sense. I’ll refer to this as generalized compositionality. It retains the two features
that are crucial for time complexity: meaning composition is polynomial and only
± values for immediate subterms matter. The limiting case is standard polynomial
compositionality, where there is only one ±i, the main semantic function ¹ itself.
Strictly speaking, then, what is motivated from complexity considerations is not
standard compositionality, but this generalized form.21
The general trend is clear: a drive to minimizing complexity is a drive to com-
positionality, more particularly to polynomial compositionality, and less particu-
larly to generalized polynomial compositionality. Under certain restrictive con-
ditions, compositionality is entailed, but these conditions tend not to be met in
natural language. There are reasons to suspect that syntactic complications and
21Alternatively, this can be presented as a system with one semantic function ¹(t,c) that takes
contextual arguments, but that leads to a computational increase. Cf. Pagin and Westerståhl 2008.
Generalized compositionality is suitable also for modal contexts (cf. Glüer and Pagin 2006, Glüer
and Pagin 2008), propositional attitude contexts and mixed quotation contexts (Pagin 2008a).
24widespread context dependence make (generalized) polynomial compositionality
impossible.22 Hence, in the end, no strict argument for compositionality is forth-
coming.
Cognitively,generalizedpolynomialcompositionalityallowssemanticprocess-
ing, both in interpretation and in production, to proceed in what is intuitively the
simplest possible way: by mere association of atomic terms with atomic concepts,
and syntactic modes of composition with conceptual modes of composition. This
in turn, allows the speaker/hearer to efﬁciently process the input on-line, i.e. to
incrementally construct the output while the input is being observed (in the case
of the hearer) or itself constructed (in the case of the speaker). For the speaker,
incremental production allows articulation of one part of a Thought to take place
in advance of detailed plans about later parts. For the hearer, incremental inter-
pretation allows the semantics to bear on the parsing process, thereby reducing
underdetermination in the transition from string to structure (cf. e.g. Mahesh,
Eiselt, and Holbrook 1999).23 What we have a reason to believe, therefore, is that
actual semantics of natural languages nonetheless approximate the computation-
ally optimal format, since it helps explaining our communicative capacities.
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